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G21This article investigates the effectiveness of monetary policy during a credit crunch by estimating a vector
autoregression on the US economy. We present evidence that interest rate cuts have a diminished impact on
growth, due to impairment in the relationship between monetary policy and the supply of intermediated
credit.ll rights reserved.© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Recent events in ﬁnancial markets have raised concerns about
whether monetary policy has lost effectiveness during the ongoing
global credit crunch. Although the role of intermediated credit in the
monetary transmission mechanism has been examined extensively in
the empirical literature, including Kashyap et al. (1993), Morgan
(1998), and more recently Lown and Morgan (2006), this paper
provides new insights by investigating whether the “credit channel”
of monetary policy becomes less effective during periods in which
shocks to the ﬁnancial system impair the process of credit creation, i.e.
“credit crunches”.
We identify four credit crunches in the US during the past four
decades. We test whether the impact of changes in policy rates on
GDP growth was more muted during these episodes, by estimating a
vector autoregression with four endogenous variables (output,
inﬂation, real interest rates and credit). Our results provide supportive
evidence of a weakening in the transmission mechanism, and point to
impairment in the relationship between monetary policy and the
supply of intermediated credit as the potential cause. We include the
currently ongoing credit crunch in our estimation sample in order for
our results to be of greater relevance to current events, but it needs
mentioning that the current episode represents an incomplete cycle
to date.2. Classiﬁcation of credit crunches
Following Bernanke and Lown (1991), we deﬁne a credit crunch as
“a signiﬁcant leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans”, i.e. a
period of declining loan growth which is sharper than expected for
the stage of the economic cycle — over and above any decline which
can be attributed to falling loan demand and deterioration in
borrower quality. Again following Bernanke and Lown (1991), we
measure loan growth in nominal terms.What matters is the real value
of new credit extensions, which is better approximated by the
nominal growth rate of loans outstanding if the effective maturity of
loans is relatively long.
Table 1 below compares growth in commercial and industrial
(C&I) loans at all commercial banks with GDP growth during six
economic downturns experienced in the US over the past four
decades. Four of these episodes exhibit signiﬁcant declines in loan
growth relative to GDP growth and thus accord with our deﬁnition of
a credit crunch: (1) the mid 1970s aftermath of the oil shock, (2) the
early 1990s fallout from the Savings and Loans crisis, (3) the early
2000s fallout from the Dotcom Bust, and (4) the current credit crunch.
During the two 1980s recessions, however, nominal loan growth
remained relatively robust. We get similar results using total loans
data, although the declines in loan growth during the credit crunch
episodes are less pronounced. As further evidence that our credit
crunches are driven by shifts in supply rather than demand for loans,
we look at the Fed's Senior Loan Ofﬁcer (SLO) credit standards series
over the relevant periods. Credit standards were tightened more
signiﬁcantly during our four credit crunches compared to the two
Table 1
Comparison of credit crunch episodes.
Perioda Loan growth GDP growth Credit standardsb
1974Q3–76Q2 −2.4 −1.6 77
1979Q3–80Q3 7.6 −1.6 36
1982Q2–83Q2 4.4 −2.1 16
1989Q3–93Q4 −1.9 −1.0 57
2000Q3–04Q2 −5.0 0.7 60
2008Q4–09Q2 −12.9 −2.5 84
a We deﬁne each period from the onset of slowdown to the onset of recovery in loan
growth. Given that in several cases the downturn in loan growth lags the downturn in
GDP growth, we measure GDP growth over different start and end points, taking the
quarter before growth falls below 0.4 pp to the quarter before it increases above 0.4 pp.
All growth rates are calculated as the cumulative growth (pp) over the relevant period
expressed at an annualized rate.
b We measure the peak in the SLO credit standards series for large ﬁrms, constructed
as the net percentage balance of banks who tightened credit standards on C&I loans
over the past three months.
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severity of the downturn.
3. Data issues and model estimation
We estimate an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) with
four endogenous variables, output, inﬂation, real interest rates and
credit, on US quarterly data. Although admittedly simple, this model
incorporates the key relationships for a closed macroeconomy.
Variables are speciﬁed as follows: output (log GDP at constant prices),
inﬂation (ﬁrst differenced log GDP deﬂator), real interest rates
(Federal Funds effective rate minus inﬂation rate), and credit (TED
spread, deﬁned as the difference between the 3-month Eurodollar
deposit rate and the yield on 3-month Treasury bills). GDP and GDP
deﬂator data are taken from the EcoWin database, and Federal Funds,
commercial bank loans, SLO credit standards, Eurodollar and Treasury
bill interest rates are taken from the Federal Reserve Board database.
We estimate over sample period 1972Q2–2009Q2, given that
Eurodollar deposit rates were only available from 1971, and 2009Q2
is the latest available data point. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests
for unit roots indicated that all variables were non-stationary, hence
all were ﬁrst differenced with the effect that non-stationarity was no
longer detected.
For our credit variable we use the TED spread rather than actual
loans data — it shows a signiﬁcant correlation with real loan growth,
but we argue that it serves as a cleaner proxy for identifying shifts in
the supply of credit. The problem with using actual loan volumes is
that these are affected by shifts in loan demand as well as loan supply,
for example, during a recession ﬁrms and households tend to reduce
their demand for credit, resulting in lower lending volumes. Using raw
loans data in the VAR could therefore potentially create an
endogeneity bias. The TED spread is less prone to this sort of problem.
It measures the credit risk premium between an unsecured deposit
rate and a government-backed obligation— it is reasonable to assume
that such premia are relatively unaffected by shifts in loan demand.
Rather, movements in the TED spread are traditionally associatedwith
shocks to the banking system. Such episodes are likely to experience
shortages of credit availability, as has happened recently, with banksTable 2
Sums of VAR dummy co-efﬁcients.
Dependent variable (1) (2)
GDP 6.14 (.000) 3.32 (.002)
Credit −2.45 (.003) −2.92 (.000)
The table reports the sum of co-efﬁcients on the dummies on interest rate lags in the GDP and c
sum of dummy co-efﬁcients is signiﬁcantly greater (less) than zero in the GDP (credit) equation
respectively. Column(4) reports the results extending the credit crunch subsample to include th
results truncating the sample at 1990Q1, with 3 lags.which have suffered credit losses retrenching from lending in order to
replenish their depleted capital. Thus, we argue that the TED spread is
more correlated with shifts in loan supply than loan demand.
We test whether monetary policy becomes less effective during a
credit crunch by estimating whether the interest rate lag co-efﬁcients
in the GDP equation of the VAR become signiﬁcantly smaller.
Interactive dummies are included on all lags; these are set equal to
1 during time intervals denoted as credit crunches. Formally, we test
the null H0 : ∑
n
i=1
δri≤0 against the alternative H1 : ∑
n
i=1
δri > 0, where
δir represents the interactive dummies on the interest rate lags in the
GDP equation and n denotes the number of lags. Since the interest
rate lags are predicted to have negative signs, rejection of the null
would imply that the cumulative lagged effect of interest rate changes
on GDP growth is signiﬁcantly smaller during credit crunches, holding
constant all other variables. Furthermore, we shed light on whether
this effect, if present, can be explained by impairment in the
relationship between monetary policy and the supply of interme-
diated credit. Under normal conditions, one would expect tighter
(looser) monetary policy to lead to tighter (looser) credit, through the
operation of the credit channel, hence we predict a positive
relationship between the Federal Funds rate and the TED spread.
We test whether this relationship becomes weaker during credit
crunches by testing whether the interest rate lags in the credit
equation become signiﬁcantly smaller, i.e. whether the sum of interest
rate dummies is signiﬁcantly negative.
Time dummieswere included to account for the unexplained surge
in activity in 1978Q2, and spikes in the TED spread due to ﬁnancial
shocks in 1974Q2–Q3, 1980Q3 and 1987Q4. The credit crunch
subsample consists of 47 observations in total: 1973Q4–76Q3,
1990Q1–94Q3, 2000Q4–02Q4 and 2007Q4–09Q2. We believe this is
sufﬁcient to give reasonable power to the parameter estimates and
avoid small sample bias. In our preferred speciﬁcation we include four
lags of each variable (Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for autocorre-
lation suggest this is sufﬁcient), but re-estimate using three and ﬁve
lags for robustness.
4. Results
Table 2 reports themain results of the VAR estimations. The results
show consistent evidence of attenuation in the impact of interest rate
changes on GDP growth in the credit crunch subsample. The sum of
interest rate dummies in the GDP equation is positive, economically
signiﬁcant and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all lag
speciﬁcations. The results also show evidence of impairment in the
relationship between monetary policy and credit, with the sum of
dummy co-efﬁcients in the credit equation being negative and highly
signiﬁcant in all three speciﬁcations. The results are robust to
extending and shortening the start and end dates of each crunch
period by one quarter. We also re-estimate using the SLO credit
standards series for the credit variable. The ﬁndings on the
relationship between interest rates and GDP growth remain robust,
but the relationship between interest rates and credit becomes
weaker, with the dummies in the credit equation retaining the correct
sign but becoming less signiﬁcant (Lown and Morgan (2006) suggest
that alternative measures to the Federal Funds rate might be(3) (4) (5)
5.29 (.000) 2.51 (.012) 3.54 (.003)
−2.80 (.003) −0.04 (.476) −1.55 (.037)
redit equations. In brackets we report the p-value of a one-tailedWald test onwhether the
. The ﬁrst three columns refer to the original VAR estimationwith four, three, and ﬁve lags
e1980s recessions (1979Q4–80Q3and1982Q3–83Q2),with 4 lags. Column (5) reports the
44 M. Bijapur / Economics Letters 106 (2010) 42–44appropriate in uncovering the relationship between monetary policy
and credit standards).
In order to investigate the possibility that the results are picking up
asymmetric effects of interest rates during booms and recessions, as
opposed to the impact of credit crunches, we also re-estimate
including the two 1980s recessions in the credit crunch subsample.
In the preferred speciﬁcation with four lags, the sum of interest rate
dummies in the GDP equation does become smaller (halving in size),
but remains statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the sum of interest
rate dummies in the credit equation is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant. These results suggest that the weakness in the transmis-
sion mechanism is being driven by two different effects: a “credit
crunch” effect and a “recession” effect.
It also needs mentioning that the possibility of structural change
within our estimation period might affect the results. For example,
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) ﬁnd evidence of a structural
break in output volatility in the 1980s, and argue that models
estimated over periods which span the break point are potentially
misspeciﬁed. However, we do not explicitly allow for this (and other
potential) breaks in our VAR estimation, as to do so would reduce
degrees of freedom in our (already constrained) credit crunch
subsample and thus make it more difﬁcult to identify the effects of
interest.
A related concern is that, given that three of our four credit
crunches occur post 1990, onemight argue that our results are picking
up recent improvements in monetary policy-making, for which
Cecchetti et al. (2006) ﬁnd supportive evidence. If pre-emptive
changes in interest rates lead to smaller output ﬂuctuations, then the
observed impact of interest rates on GDP might appear smaller.
However, re-estimating post 1990 (the break point chosen in
Cecchetti et al. (2006)), and including only 3 lags in order to conserve
degrees of freedom in the reduced sample size, the results appear
relatively robust. The dummies retain the correct signs, and are of a
similar magnitude in the GDP equation, but become smaller (although
still signiﬁcant at the 5% level) in the credit equation.
5. Conclusions
This paper tests whether the impact of cuts in policy rates on GDP
growth has beenmoremuted during episodes of shortages of credit in
the US economy, by estimating a simple vector autoregression on key
macroeconomic aggregates.We ﬁnd that the impact of policy rate cutson GDP growth becomes diminished, and the relationship between
policy rates and credit becomes weaker. Our results suggest that
monetary policy becomes less effective during a credit crunch, but
also suggest that the weakness in the transmission mechanism is
being driven by two different effects: a “credit crunch” effect and a
“recession” effect. However, an attempt to disentangle these two
effects is beyond the scope of the present article and is left for future
work.
Although we do not investigate the speciﬁc mechanisms through
which the credit channel becomes impaired, one possible explanation
is based on Adrian and Shin (2008). Shocks to the banking system
which result in depletion of capital can lead banks to retrench from
lending, in order to adjust down their leverage ratios. Consequently,
cuts in policy rates could be absorbed into banks' margins during the
process of balance sheet restructuring, and thus have a diminished
impact on the real economy. A more aggressive monetary policy
response would therefore be warranted, combined with a potential
role for ﬁscal stabilisation.
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